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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
* * * * * 
 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CHARLENE A. HERMISOLLO and JESSE HERMOSILLO, wife and husband, Defendants-
Respondents, 
 
* * * * * 
 
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 45391 and 45645 
 
 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
 
* * * * * 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Madison County. 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge, presiding. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant, Credit Bureau of Eastern 
Idaho, Inc. 
 
Larren Covert, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Respondents, Charleane and Jesse 
Hermosillo 
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
The Respondent, Jesse Acedo’s (“Jesse”) Statement of the Facts are inaccurate or 
misleading as follows: 
1. Jesse was served with a summons and complaint stating that he was “hereby 
notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written response must be filed with 
the above designated court”1 on April 27, 2009.2  When served with the complaint and summons, 
Jesse informed the process server that “Charleane Hermosillo was not home” and he “indicated 
he was her husband.”3 
2. There is no dispute that the majority of the medical bills contained in the 
complaint were for the minor child of Charleane Hermosillo and Jesse.  Jesse admits this fact in 
Respondent’s Brief at page 6 and as confirmed this fact to counsel for CBEI on multiple occasions.4 
3. The magistrate court mailed copies of the judgment to Jesse at the address where 
he was served.  Jesse contacted counsel for CBEI on June 4, 2009, just two days after the 
magistrate court entered default.   Jesse personally spoke with counsel for CBEI and explained 
that he and Charleane Hermosillo had a child together and agreed to make voluntary payments.5 
4. CBEI made a motion to change the name of John Doe to Jesse Hermosillo based 
upon the representation that Jesse made to the process server indicating he was Charleane 
                     
1 R Vol. I, pp. 15-16.  
2 R Vol. I, p. 17.  
3 R Vol. I, pp. 136-40. 
4 R Vol. I, pp. 141-42. 
5 R Vol. I, pp. 141-42. 
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Hermosillo’s husband.6  CBEI did use Jesse’s social security number, given to counsel for CBEI 
during an order of examination, to identify him in garnishment proceedings.7 
5. CBEI garnished Jesse on multiple occasions and collected $3,651.70 from Jesse’s 
wages and Jesse never filed a claim of exemption until the bank garnishment was sent nearly 33 
months later.8  Jesse was represented by counsel in this matter from early on in the proceedings, 
never filed a claim of exemption and agreed to voluntary payments after the garnishment was 
returned partially satisfied.  On September 9, 2009, counsel for Jesse sent a letter to CBEI claiming 
CBEI’s garnishment attempts were improper because none of the bills that made up the 
judgment were Jesse’s.9  That same day, September 9, 2009, counsel for CBEI responded and 
explained that Jesse was liable for the majority of the judgment debt because these bills were for 
Jesse’s minor daughter.10  Neither Jesse nor his counsel responded to the letter from CBEI.  After 
additional attempts at garnishment, Jesse began making voluntary payments to CBEI via personal 
checks.  Jesse made $50 payments via check on June 21, 2011, and July 12, 2011.11 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE 
COURT BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF A THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF EXEMPTION WAS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
 
 Jesse does not respond to any of the arguments contained in Appellant’s Brief on 
Appeal but instead argues only that the issues CBEI raised in the notice of appeal and discussed 
                     
6 R Vol. I, pp. 21-22. 
7 R Vol. I, pp. 120-21. 
8 R Vol. I, pp. 44-52. 
9 R Vol. I, p. 266. 
10 R Vol. I, p. 268. 
11 R Vol. I, pp. 141-46. 
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in Appellant’s Brief are not properly before this Court.  However, the issues that CBEI appealed 
from are properly before this Court as they address the precise reasons the District Court erred 
in affirming the decision of the Magistrate Court granting the Renewed Third-Party Claim of 
Exemption.  Specifically, CBEI appeals from and addresses the issue of whether the District 
Court erred in affirming the Magistrate Court’s order granting of the renewed claim of 
exemption.  Both lower courts erred, by abruptly holding that the  judgment was void for lack 
of jurisdiction, without following the District Court’s own order to determine if the proper 
procedure for obtaining relief from a potentially void judgment was followed.   
1. Jesse’s Renewed Third-Party Claim of Exemption Was Not Properly Before the 
Magistrate Court. 
 
The record in this case is clear that the issue throughout this entire case is whether 
Jesse moved to have the judgment against him set side in a timely manner.  In the very first 
hearing on the original third-party claim of exemption, the Magistrate Court correctly 
concluded that to determine the issue of a third-party claim of exemption, it first had to 
determine whether or not Jesse was a third party.  For that reason, the Magistrate Court 
correctly denied the original claim of exemption and held that the appropriate remedy was for 
Jesse to seek to have the judgment set aside.   
The minutes from the first hearing on the original claim of exemption clearly state that 
the “[m]otion for exemption – denied.”12  The record is very clear that the claim of exemption 
was denied and that the magistrate court determined the appropriate remedy was for Jesse to 
seek to have the default set aside.  The order prepared by Jesse’s counsel and signed on June 4, 
                     
12 R Vol. I, p. 147. 
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2012 makes this clear as it states “Jesse shall file any motions to have this matter set aside by 
June 8, 2012.13   This fact is further supported by the fact that on June 1, 2012, Jesse filed a 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and for Sanctions, CBEI opposed the motion but the 
Magistrate Court improperly set the judgment aside and was later overturned on appeal.14   
Neither the briefing for those hearings or the transcript of those hearings mentions the 
third-party claim of exemption as it had clearly already been decided.  The only issue discussed 
in the briefing leading up to those hearings and argued at the hearings was the issue of setting 
the judgment aside.  It is only logical that to determine a third-party claim of exemption, you 
must first determine whether Jesse is a party to the matter or a third-party.  For these reasons 
the Magistrate Court and the District Court, on the first appeal, were only deciding whether the 
judgment should be set aside pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b).    
It is crucial to this appeal to take notice that Jesse never filed a reconsideration or an 
appeal on the issue of the claim of exemption and the only issues raised at any time on appeal 
were those raised by CBEI arguing that the Magistrate Court erred in setting the judgment aside.   
This fact is clear from the record, the only issues on appeal were those contained in CBEI’s 
Amended Notice of Appeal filed August 29, 2012, importantly, the issue of the claim of exemption 
was not appealed from or even mentioned after the original hearing on the motion to contest.15  
By not filing a motion to reconsider or appeal the denial of the third-party claim of exemption 
and moving forward with a motion to set the judgment aside, Jesse waived the issue of the third-
party claim of exemption.  Thus, from that point forward in the in the case the decision on the 
                     
13 R Vol. I, pp. 220-24. 
14 R Vol. I, pp. 173-219. 
15 R Vol. I, pp. 251-53. 
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claim of exemption was the law of the case and the only issued moving forward was the issue of 
whether the Magistrate Court erred in setting the judgment aside.   
2. The District Court Erred in Affirming the Order of the Magistrate Court Granting 
the Renewed Third-Party Claim of Exemption Without First Making a Finding on 
Whether Jesse Followed the Proper Procedure for Seeking Relief from the 
Judgment. 
 
The fact that the issue of claim of exemption was settled and that the Magistrate Court 
correctly concluded, during the first hearing on the third-party claim of exemption, that it must 
first determine whether Jesse was a party to the case or a third party is logical and clear from the 
record before this Court.   The District Court’s decision on the first appeal makes this fact even 
more clear as that decision deals exclusively with the Magistrate Court’s setting the judgment 
aside.16  On remand the District Court’s Decision on Appeal has an entire section titled “The 
Magistrate Court’s rulings were predicated upon its findings of (1) lack of personal jurisdiction 
and (2) voidness under Rule 60(b)(4).”17  The District Court found the judgment was void under 
Rule 60(b)(4)  but held that the Magistrate Court “erred by failing to make a finding that the 
motion to set aside was brought within a reasonable time.”18  The District Court also explained 
that there must be a determination of a meritorious defense to set the judgment aside.19   
The District Court in reversing the decision of the Magistrate Court and remanding it back, 
specifically stated that the “order setting aside the judgement should be vacated and the matter 
remanded for further proceedings on Acedo’s motion not inconsistent with this opinion.”20 
(Emphasis added).  The further proceedings were to be on “Acedo’s motion,” which can only 
                     
16 R Vol. I, pp. 325-340. 
17 R Vol. I, p. 331. 
18 R Vol. I, p. 336. 
19 R Vol. I, p. 336. 
20 R Vol. I, p. 336. 
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mean the motion that was appealed from, the motion the entire District Court’s opinion was 
focused on, the motion to set the judgment aside,  and not some previous motion that had not 
been appealed.  The District Court’s conclusion was very clear, the Magistrate Court “failed to 
make a finding that the motion to set aside was timely under Rule 60(b)(4),” that the “Magistrate 
Court erred in failing to state the authority upon which it based its award of attorney fees against 
CBEI” and that the District Court “remands this matter to the Magistrate Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”21  Meaning the Magistrate Court was to make a finding 
on the timeliness of the motion to set aside and the authority upon which it based its award of 
attorney fees.  There was never any mention of reconsidering the claim of exemption.  However, 
rather than rule on the only issues on remand, the Magistrate Court considered and ultimately 
ruled on Jesse Acedo’s Renewed Third-Party Claim of Exemption Request of Sanctions and 
Attorney Fees.22 
CBEI filed a timely appeal on the issues of whether the Magistrate Court committed 
reversible error by disregarding the decision of the District Court by not making a finding on the 
timeliness of the motion to set aside and Jesse not having a meritorious defense for setting the 
judgment aside among other issues.23  The District Court on the second appeal admits that: 
In its decision on appeal, the Court instructed the magistrate court to make 
findings as to whether Acedo’s motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant 
to Rule 60(b) was brought in a reasonable time.  On remand, the magistrate court 
revised its decision, concluding for the first time that Acedo, as a non-party, has 
no basis for setting side the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).  Instead, the 
magistrate court decided the issue based on Acedo’s filing of a third party claim of 
exemption.” (Emphasis added).24 
                     
21 R Vol. I, p. 340. 
22 R Vol. I, pp. 341-91. 
23 R Vol. I, pp. 500-03. 
24 R Vol. I, p. 569. 
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The District Court then held that “[a]lthough this issue [the issue of the timeliness of filing the 
Rule 60(b) motion] was raised on appeal,” “[i]n light of the magistrate court’s revised ruling, it is 
no longer necessary to make the required findings on remand to complete the Rule 60(b) 
analysis.”25  The District Court erred in not enforcing its order on the first appeal and by affirming 
the decision of the Magistrate Court granting Jesse’s Renewed Third Party Claim of Exemption, 
an issue that was never appealed from by Jesse, that had become the law of the case, and that 
was not appropriately before the Magistrate or the District Court.   
From the record in this case and for the reasons explained in this brief, the issue of 
whether the District Court committed reversible error, by affirming the Magistrate Court’s order 
granting the third-party claim of exemption, hinges on whether that issue was even properly 
considered.  The record shows that the only issue on the first appeal was the determination on 
the motion to set the judgment aside.  To even get to the issue of granting the third-party claim 
of exemption, the Magistrate Court and in turn the District Court first had to determine whether 
Jesse was a party to the case or a third party.  The District Court clearly understood this and held 
that even if the judgment were void for lack of jurisdiction, Jesse had to file a timely Rule 60(b) 
motion.  The Magistrate Court also understood this when it denied the original claim of 
exemption and ordered a motion to set aside the judgment be filed.  However, the second time 
around, the Magistrate Court completely circumvented the actual issue before the court and 
simply found the judgment void again failing to rule on the timeliness of Jesse’s Rule 60(b) motion 
as ordered by the District Court.  Thus, because the issue of whether the Magistrate and District 
                     
25 R Vol. I, p. 569. 
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Court improperly granted the Renewed Third-Party Claim of exemption, because the judgment 
was void, without determining whether Jesse filed a timely motion for relief from the judgment, 
is the central issue on this appeal and is properly before this Court. 
B. JESSE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Jesse seeks attorney’s fees on appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code 
Sections 12-120(1),(2) and (3).  The Court should deny this request because CBEI should be the 
prevailing party on appeal.  Jesse also seeks attorney’s fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 
because Jesse claims that CBEI “has continued a frivolous pursuit of collecting money from Jesse” 
and that therefore the appeal is without foundation.  However, CBEIs continued attempts to 
collect on its properly obtained judgment, against a defendant who admittedly owed the money, 
cannot be considered frivolous.  Additionally, the arguments being made in this appeal show that 
the appeal is with foundation and is being pursued for the specific purpose of correcting errors 
in the lower courts’ conclusions.  Jesse is therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees under Section 
12-121. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth in this Brief and Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, CBEI respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s decision affirming the Magistrate Court’s 
decision and remand the case with instructions to deny defendant’s “Third-Party Claim of 
Exemption” and to make findings as to whether the motion to seek relief under Rule 60(b) has 
been timely made.  This Court should also reverse the decision of the District Court awarding fees 
to Jesse on appeal and award CBEI its costs and attorney’s fees on appeal. 
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DATED this 2nd day of August, 2018. 
                 SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
 
      By:  /s/ Bryan N. Zollinger______________ 
             Bryan N. Zollinger 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL to be served, by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by causing 
the same to be delivered by hand, facsimile or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
 
[XX]  U.S. Mail      Larren Covert, Esq. 
[     ]  Facsimile Transmission    Swafford Law, P.C. 
[     ]  Hand Delivery     655 S. Woodruff Ave. 
[XX]  Email      Idaho Falls, ID  83401 
       Email:  larrenc@swaffordlaw.com 
     
 
 
 
       By:   /s/ Bryan N. Zollinger  
                             Bryan N. Zollinger 
 
  
 
 
 
 
